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Abstract
We introduce novel security proofs that use combinatorial counting arguments rather
than reductions to the discrete logarithm or to the Diﬃe-Hellman problem. Our security
results are sharp and clean with no polynomial reduction times involved. We consider
a combination of the random oracle model and the generic model. This corresponds to
assuming an ideal hash function H given by an oracle and an ideal group of prime order
q, where the binary encoding of the group elements is useless for cryptographic attacks
In this model, we ﬁrst show that Schnorr signatures are secure against the one-more
signature forgery: A generic adversary performing t generic steps including ` sequential
interactions with the signer cannot produce `+1 signatures with a better probability than ¡t
2
¢
/q. We also characterize the diﬀerent power of sequential and of parallel attacks.
Secondly, we prove signed ElGamal encryption is secure against the adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack, in which an attacker can arbitrarily use a decryption oracle except for the
challenge ciphertext. Moreover, signed ElGamal encryption is secure against the one-more
decryption attack: A generic adversary performing t generic steps including ` interactions
with the decryption oracle cannot distinguish the plaintexts of ` + 1 ciphertexts from
random strings with a probability exceeding
¡t
2
¢
/q.
1 Introduction and Summary
Proving security for cryptographic primitives like signatures and encryption is a challeng-
ing problem in particular for an interactive setting, where an active adversary interferes in
the interaction. We introduce novel security proofs for discrete log cryptosystems that use
combinatorial counting arguments rather than reductions to the discrete logarithm or to the
Diﬃe-Hellman problem. Our security results are sharp and clean with no polynomial re-
duction times involved. Our approach separates in a better way cryptographic weaknesses
of the hash function, the group and the cryptographic protocols. This separation is crucial.
If an attack is possible for a speciﬁc hash function or group we need a stronger hash func-
tion or group while keeping the cryptographic protocols. As NIST has proposed strong hash
functions and strong groups it makes sense to analyze cryptographic protocols assuming that
the hash function and the group have no cryptographic weaknessses. So we merely consider
attacks that work for all hash functions and for all groups. If an attack occurs that works
1for a speciﬁc hash function or group in use, then the latter must be replaced. Formally, we
assume the random oracle model (ROM) for the hash function and the generic model for the
group. This is a combination of two already accepted models. We do NOT assume that the
discrete log problem is hard, our security proofs contain a hardness proof for the discrete log
problem in the generic model. Our approach has practical consequences.
Previous security proofs for discrete log cryptosystems do not prove security for the most
simple, unbroken discrete log schemes. Additional control mechanisms have been introduced
into yet unbroken cryptographic protocols in order to simplify the reductions to the discrete
log or to the Diﬃe-Hellman problem. We prove that the most simple, unbroken discrete log
schemes are secure in a reasonable security model.
Traditional security proofs for discrete log signatures in the random oracle model [PS96a,PS96b,P98]
polynomially transform successful attacks into discrete log computations. In [PS96a] it is
shown that various DL-signatures, in particular Schnorr signatures, are secure against the
adaptive chosen message attack. The security proofs in [PS96b, P98] apply to blind signa-
tures in the interactive setting. The security proof in [PS96b] requires that the number of
interactions of the parallel attacker with the signer are poly-logarithmically bounded. In [P98]
a third party — the checker — has been introduceded, and it was shown that the resulting
three-party signature protocol is secure for a polynomial number of synchronized signer in-
teractions, where the synchronization forces the completion of each step for all the diﬀerent
protocol invocations before the next step of any other invocation is started. Moreover, these
schemes use more complicated signatures — Okamoto-Schnorr signatures with multiple key
components. Our novel security proofs are for the most simple discrete log signatures covering
general parallel attacks, we exemplify them for Schnorr signatures.
For public key encryption schemes we refer to the schemes of Shoup, Gennaro [SG98],
Cramer, Shoup [CS98], Abdalla, Bellare, Rogaway [ABR98] and Zheng, Seberry
[ZS92]. All these schemes extend ELGamal encryption by a signature or tag. This idea ﬁrst
appears in [ZS92] without a security proof. Security against strong chosen ciphertext attacks
has been proved in [SG98, CS98, ABR98]. The schemes in [SG98, CS98, ABR98] use an
involved tag construction and key generation to simplify the reduction to the discrete log
and to the Diﬃe-Hellmamn problem, the tag in [ABR98] uses symmetric encryption. We
consider the most simple extension of ElGamal encryption that was independently proposed
by Tsiounis and Yung [TY98] and Jakobsson [J98]. Herein, a Schnorr signature providing a
proof of knowledge of the plaintext and of the secret encryption parameter r is added to the
ElGamal ciphertext. We call this encryption the signed ElGamal encryption.
Our results on signatures. The most powerful attack is the one-more signature forgery
introduced in [PS96b, P98], where security means that an attacker cannot obtain ` + 1 valid
signatures from ` interactions with the signer. The most general case are parallel attacks,
where the parallel interactions are non-synchronous and arbitrarily interleaved. Security
against this attack is important in e-commerce, where it translates into that an adversary
cannot ”create additional money”. We prove security of plain Schnorr signatures against the
one more signature forgery. We present a sharp security bound for sequential attacks, where
a generic adversary using t generic steps cannot succeed better than with probability
¡t
2
¢
/q.
Parallel attacks surpassing the power of sequential attacks must solve an established hard
problem: solving — from a system of t distinct linear equations in ` variables, where the
inhomogenities are random integers modulo a prime q, and ` < t < q — more than ` linear
equations modulo q. This holds for ` arbitrary interactions with the signer with arbitrary
interleaving. The fastest known algorithm that solves more than ` equations does not succeed
2better than with probability
¡T
2
¢
/q using T arithmetic steps modulo q. By the famous work
of Hastad [H97], the corresponding problem with constant inhomogenities is NP-hard in
worst case.1 We note that the problem with random inhomogenities seems to be hard for all
instances. This makes it a natural and attractive hard NP-problem.
Our results on encryption. We prove that signed ElGamal encryption is secure against
the strong adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, where an attacker can use a decryption oracle
— except for the challenge ciphertext. We show that a generic attacker using t generic
steps cannot decrypt the challenge ciphertext better than with probability
¡t
2
¢
/q. Moreover,
signed ElGamal encryption is secure against the one-more decryption attack.2 If a generic
adversary performs t generic steps, is given statistically independent ciphertexts and access
to a decryption oracle some ` times, he cannot decrypt ` + 1 ciphertexts better than with
probability
¡t
2
¢
/q. Our security bounds are sharp, the same optimal upper bound
¡t
2
¢
/q holds
for the success probability all attacks. The probability is for a random private key x, a random
hash function H, and the coin ﬂips of the encipherer.
Finally, and of possible independent interest, is a scheme for fast encryption of long
messages that we propose. The scheme is based on El-Gamal encryption, and can be proved
to have the same security as our basic encryption scheme, without any further assumptions.
2 The Random Oracle and the Generic Model
The random oracle model (ROM). Let G be a group of prime order q with generator
g, a range M of messages, and let Zq denote the ﬁeld of integers modulo q. Let H be an
ideal hash function with range Zq. Informally, the hash function H is modelled as an oracle
that given an input (query) of the appropriate form outputs a random number in Zq. We
will use diﬀerent input formats onwards, inputs in G × M for plain signatures and inputs in
Gn for encryption. Formally, H is a random function either of type H : G × M → Zq, or
of type H : Gn → Zq for some n — chosen at random over all functions of that type with
uniform probability distribution. The ROM goes back to Fiat and Shamir [FS86] and has
been further developed by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93].
The Generic Model (GM). Let the group G be ideal in that the binary encoding of the
group elements is useless for cryptographic attacks.3 By the ideal group assumption, the
adversary is not given the binary encoding of group elements, but can access group elements
only for group operations and equality tests. The generic model of algorithms goes back
to Nechaev [Ne94] who proves in this model that the discrete logarithm problem is hard.
Generic algorithms have been further elaborated by Shoup [Sh97].4 We slightly modify the
1Theorem 2.4 [H97]. For any ε > 0 and prime q, it is NP-hard to approximate the maximal number of
satisﬁable equations modulo q within a factor q − ε.
2The one-more decryption attack is not covered by the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. An adversary
can use the challenge ciphertexts in an arbitrary way for queries to the decryption oracle. This is excluded in
the adaptive ciphertext attack.
3The ideal group assumption is believed to hold for random elliptic curves and for subgroups G ⊂ Z
∗
p of
the multiplicative group Z
∗
p of integers modulo a prime p, provided that G is of prime order q, q and (p−1)/q
are random and p/q is so large that sieving methods for discrete log computations are ineﬃcient.
4Our generic model is close to that of Shoup [Sh97] but diﬀers as follows. Shoup counts equality tests and
group operations (performed by oracles), whereas we only count group operations allowing a more general class
of group operations. The [Sh97] algorithms use internal coin ﬂips and a random encoding of group elements,
we eliminate these random sources as they are useless. Our generic complexity lower bounds are a bit stronger
than those for the Shoup model.
3Shoup model and we extend it to algorithms that interact with a signature/decryption oracle.
Signatures and encryption are for the private/public key pair is (x,h), where x is random
in Zq and h = gx. We describe the extended generic model in detail. (Other extensions are
possible using diﬀerent types of interactions, e.g. for diﬀerent signature/encryption schemes.)
Generic steps. In the ROM + GM we count for generic steps:
• group operations, i.e. multivariate exponentiations
mexa : Gd → G, (g1,...,gd) 7→
Q
i g
ai
i with a = (a1,...,ad) ∈ Zd
q,
• queries to the hash oracle H,
• interactions with a signature/decryption oracle (signer/decryptor for short).
A generic adversary A — attacking a signature/encryption scheme — is an interactive
algorithm that interacts with a signer/decryptor. It performs a straight-line program con-
sisting of some t generic steps resulting in t0 ≤ t group elements f1,...,ft0 and non-group
data (containing no group elements). A iteratively selects the next generic step — a group
operation, a query to H, an interaction with the signer/decryptor — arbitrarily depending
on the previously computed non-group data. The hash queries in G × M respectively in Gn
may arbitrarily depend on previously computed group elements and non-group-data.
The input consists of the generator g, the public key h ∈ G, and e.g. a collection of
messages, signatures and ciphertexts consisting of group elements and non-group data.
The group elements f1,...,ft0 ∈ G are: the group elements contained in the input, the
results of the group operations mexa, the group elements that an interactive A receives
from the signer/decryptor (the signer/decryptor replies with at most one group element per
interaction and thus t0 ≤ t). The sequence f1,...,ft0 starts with the group elements contained
in the input f1 = g,f2 = h etc., the input group elements are counted as generic steps.
The non-group data are: the non-group data contained in the input, the exponent vectors
a of the generic group operations mexa, the hash replies H(Q) of queries Q, the equalities
fi = fj (called collisions) and inequalities fi 6= fj of all previously computed fi,fj, and the
non-group data that A receives in signer/decryptor interactions.
In a signer/decryptor interaction, described in subsequent sections, the signer/decryptor
performs a generic group operation depending on the secret signature/decryption key x and,
in case of the signer, on a random number r ∈R Zq selected by the signer.
A’s output and his transmission in interactions with the signer/decryptor consists of pre-
viously computed group elements and non-group data. Interactions are sequential if there is
at most one interaction at a time, in that case the attack is called sequential. Non-sequential
attacks are called parallel. We consider the most general form of a parallel attack, where A
can interleave parallel interactions in an arbitrary way, A can start the second rounds of the
interactions in an order that is independent of the order of the ﬁrst rounds.
The restriction of the generic model is that A can use group elements only for generic
group operations, equality tests and for queries to the hash oracle. On the other hand generic
algorithms can arbitrarily transform non-group data without charge.
The probability space consists of the random group elements in the input as the public key
h ∈R G etc., the random H and the coin ﬂips of the signer (the decryptor is deterministic). A
generic adversary is deterministic. This is not a restriction as its coin ﬂips would be useless.
A can select interior coin ﬂips that maximize the probability of success.5
5There always exists a choice for the internal coin ﬂips that does not decrease A’s probability of success.
4A standard form of generic group steps. In a generic group operation A computes some
fj ∈ G of the form fj =
Q
i<j f
ai
i , where f1,...,fj−1 are the previously computed group
elements including the fi received from the signer/decryptor. The exponents a1,...,aj−1 ∈
Zq depend arbitrarily on previously computed non-group data. Let the group elements in
the input and from signer/decryptor interactions be g,h,g1,...g`. Then by induction, the
fj are of the standard form fj = gαj,0hαj,1g
αj,2
1 ...g
αj,`+1
` , where the exponent vector αj =
(αj,0,...,αj,`+1) ∈ Z`+2
q depends arbitrarily on the previously computed non-group data. We
require that A does not identically repeat a generic group operation.6
3 Schnorr Signatures, ElGamal Encryption.
We study signer interactions, an interactive protocol that enables a user to generate Schnorr
signatures of messages of its choice. We ﬁrst describe the setting and the structure of the
signatures, after which we review the protocol for generation of signatures. We later show
how this can be used to generate blind signatures of the same type.
Signatures will be based on an ideal hash function H : G × M → Zq, where M is the set
of messages.
Private/public key pairs. The private key x of the signer is random in Zq. The corre-
sponding public key is h = gx ∈ G, a random group element. We have x = logg h.
Signatures. A Schnorr signature on a message m is a triple (m,c,z) ∈ M × Z2
q such that
H(gzh−c,m) = c. For this paper, we let signatures (m,c,z) comprise the message.
Signing a message m ∈ M: Pick a random r ∈R Zq, compute gr, c := H(gr,m) and
z := r + cx. Output the signature: (m,c,z)
The result is a valid signature since we have gzh−c = gr+cxh−c = gr, and thus H(gzh−c,m) =
c. We call a signature (m,c,z) constructed by this protocol a standard signature.
A signer interaction is an interactive protocol between the signer and a user consisting of
three rounds:
signer
pick r ∈R Zq
compute gr
z := r + cx
gr
−→
c ←−
z −→
user
select c ∈ Zq
The user can generate the standard signature (m,c,z) by selecting c := H(gr,m), but he has
more options than that. We will study all possibilities to produce signatures by a sequence
of arbitrary interactions with the signer. We let (r,c,z) ∈ Z3
q denote the signer interaction
consisting of the signer’s random choice r, the user’s challenge c and the signer’s response z.
Non-interactive proof of knowledge. Schnorr signatures provide a non-interactive proof
of knowledge of the secret key x = logg h. Pointcheval and Stern [PS96] show in the ROM
how to transform in polynomial time signature forgeries into a discrete log computation.
6The exponent vectors ®i ∈ Z
`+2
q must be pairwise distinct for i = 1,...,t
0 and for all instances of the
previously computed non-group data. If ®i = ®j, i < j we can remove fj referring to fi instead.
5Blind Signature Protocol.
signer
picks r ∈R Zq
computes gr
z := r + cx
gr
−→
c ←−
z −→
user
picks α,β ∈R Zq
c := H(gr+αh−β,m) − β
z0 := z + α, c0 := c + β
A signer interaction (r,c,z) can be used to generate the standard signature (m,c,z) or a
transformation (m,c0,z0) of this signature. We call the signature protocol blind if it generates
a signature (m,c0,z0) that is statistically independent of the interaction corresponding to the
triple (r,c,z). The user can generate such an independent signature (m,c0,z0) from random
numbers α,β ∈R Zq.
Signature Validity. For the output of the interaction (m,c0,z0) = (m,c+β,z +α) we have
gz0
h−c0
= gr+cx+αh−c−β = gr+αh−β. Hence H(gz0
h−c0
,m) = c+β = c0, and thus (m,c0,z0) is
a valid signature.
Blindness Property. The generated signature (m,c+β,z+α) is — for a constant interaction
(r,c,z) — uniformly distributed over all signatures on message m due to the random α,β ∈R
Zq. Each signature (m,c0,z0) is produced for a unique pair α, β, namely α = z0−z, β = c0−c.
3.1 The Power of the Security Model, an Illustration.
This subsection refers to a generic adversary A that interacts with a signer and computes t0
group elements f1,...,ft0. We let the Main Case be the part of the probability space, where
there are no collisions among f1,...,ft0.7
Lemma 1. Collisions among f1,...,ft0 occur at most with probability
¡t0
2
¢
/q. The probability
refers to the random h,H and the coin ﬂips of the signer.
Proof. We show for i < j that Prx,r,H[fi = fj] ≤ 1
q under the condition that there is
no prior collision of group elements. So let us assume that there is no such prior col-
lision. The main point is to show that fi,fj either are s.i. or fi/fj is constant with
fi 6= fj. Let fj be in standard form fj = gαj,0hαj,1gr1αj,2...gr` αj,`+1, where the exponent
vector αj = (αj,0,...,αj,`+1) ∈ Z`+2
q depends arbitrarily on the previously computed non-
group data. The signer transmits grk in round k, r = (r1,...,r`) consists of the signers coin
tosses. Considering x and r1,...,r` as indeterminates over Zq, logg fj = hαj,(1,x,r)i 8 is a
polynomial in Zq[x,r1,...,r`] of maximal degree 1.
For a non-interactive A, where ` = 0 and r is empty we have fi = fj iﬀ hαi−αj,(1,x)i = 0,
i.e., iﬀ αi,0−αj,0+x(αi,1−αj,1) = 0. Here, αi, αj depend on x only via random hash values.
Therefore, x is s.i. of αi, αj, and thus Prx,H[fi = fj] ≤ 1
q.9
7A
¡t0
2
¢
/q-fraction of the probability space, the instances that lead to collisions, is excluded in the Main
Case. In the following, we neglect this restriction of the probability space. The impact of this restriction on
A’s probability of success is already covered by the probability
¡t0
2
¢
/q for collisions.
8Let h, i denote the standard inner product in Z
`+2
q , h®j,(1,x,r)i = αj,0 + xαj,1 +
P`+1
i=2 riαj,i+1.
9The equality fi = fj holds with zero probability if αi,0 6= αj,0 and αi,1 = αj,1. The case that ®i = ®j has
been excluded, in this case fj identically recomputes fi.
6Next consider an interactive A. We call rk prior to fj if αj depends on the signer response
zk = rk+ckx, otherwise rk is subsequent to fj, i.e., αj does not depend on zk. The probability
space of fj = ghαj,(1,x,r)i consist of x,H and the rk subsequent to fj — the rk = zk−ckx prior
to fj are linear in x, with constants zk,ck. Consider hαj,(1,x,r)i as a function in x and the rk
subsequent to fj. The vector αj ∈ Z`+2
q depends on x,H,r only via prior rk and via random
hash values, and thus x and the subsequent rk are s.i. of αj. Therefore, hαi–αj,(1,x,r)i is
either constant or uniformly distributed over Zq. The case that hαi–αj,(1,x,r)i = 0 holds for
all x and all rk subsequent to fj has been excluded.10 This shows that Prx,r,H[fi = fj] ≤ 1
q,
which implies the claim of Lemma 2 as there are
¡t0
2
¢
pairs i < j. 2
Lemma 2. Let A be given the input g and h = gx ∈R G. In the Main Case we have that
• the p.d. (probability distribution) of the non-group data is constant as h varies.
• the random h ∈R G is s.i. (statistically independent) of the computed non-group data.
Proof. Collisions of group elements fi = fj, i < j are non-group data that may depend on
h = gx, in particular if fi,fj contain powers of h. Now suppose that there is no such collision.
Then the public key h = gx, respectively x = logg h, enters into A’s non-group data only by
queries to the hash oracle and by interactions with the signer.
In the ROM hash values H(fi,m) are random, their distribution does not change with
the query (fi,m). In a signer interaction A gets the pair (grk,zk), where rk ∈ Zk is random
and zk = rk + ckx. Due to the random rk the distribution of zk is constant as h = gx varies.
Therefore, the p.d. of the non-group data generated from hash values and signer responses is
constant as h varies. In particular, the public key h = gx and thus x is s.i. of all non-group
data (h = gx is NOT s.i. of (grk,zk), however grk enters into the computation of non-group
data only by collisions of group elements and via random hash values). 2
Proposition 3. Complexity Lower Bound for Discrete logarithm [Ne94,Sh97].
Let A, upon input g and h ∈R G, output y ∈ Zq. Then Prh[y = logg h] ≤
¡t0
2
¢
/q + 1
q.
Proof. In the Main Case h is by Lemma 2 s.i. of the non-group output y, and thus Prh[y =
logg h] = 1
q. By Lemma 1, collisions occur at most with probability
¡t0
2
¢
/q. 2
An ElGamal ciphertext of a message m ∈ G with the public key h ∈ G is a pair (gr,mhr) ∈
G2, where r ∈R Zq is random.
Proposition 4. Semantic Security of ElGamal Encryption. Let a generic, non-interactive
A be given g,h, two messages m0,m1 ∈ G and a ciphertext (gr,mbhr) for random r ∈R Zq
and b ∈R {0,1}. Let A output a guess b0 for b. Then Prb,h,r[b0 = b] ≤
¡t0
2
¢
/q + 1
2.
Proof. Consider the impact of permuting m0,m1 in A’s input without changing g,h,b,mb.
We apply the argument of Lemma 2 to the transformed input. In the Main Case that
transform does not aﬀect the p.d. of the non-group output b0. In the Main Case b is s.i.
of b0 and thus Prb,h,r[b0 = b] = 1
2. The Main Case occurs except with probability
¡t0
2
¢
/q. 2
10Then fj identically repeats — under the condition zk = rk + ckx — the computation of fi, so we can
remove fj from the computation referring to fi instead.
74 Security of Signed ElGamal Encryption
We study the security of signed ElGamal encryption in the ROM + GM. Signed ElGamal
encryption was independently proposed by Tsiounis and Yung [TY98] and Jakobsson [J98].
This scheme is semantically secure against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (Theorem 5).
This is equivalent to non-malleability against chosen ciphertext attacks [DDN91]. We refer to
non-malleability as deﬁned in [DDN91] and to the strong chosen ciphertext attack proposed
by Rackoff and Simon [RS92]. The adversary has access to a decryption oracle which can
be used arbitrarily except for the challenge ciphertext. We let the adversary interact with a
decryption oracle without that any further party is involved. Therefore, the adversary can
only use ciphertexts that are either given for input or are self-produced.
We show in Theorem 6 that signed ElGamal encryption is secure against the one-more
decryption attack: An adversary can — after arbitrary ` interactions with the decryption
oracle — not decrypt more than ` ciphertexts, more precisely he gets non-zero information
on at most ` of the corresponding plaintexts. The adversary can arbitrarily use the chal-
lenge ciphertexts for queries to the decryptor which is excluded in adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacks.
The private/public key pair x, h = gx of the decryptor is as for the signer: x is random
in Zq. We let messages be contained in G or more generally in Gn for an arbitrary natural
number n. We use an ideal hash function H : Gn+2 → Zq. The domain Gn+2 of H is diﬀerent
from the hash function for signing.
Enciphering a message m ∈ G by signed ElGamal encryption. Pick random r,s ∈R
Zq, compute ¯ h := gr, ¯ f := mhr, c := H(gs,gr,mhr) and z := s + cr.
Output the ciphertext (gr,mhr,c,z) = (¯ h, ¯ f,c,z).
A decryption oracle is a function that decrypts valid ciphertexts :
user
(¯ h, ¯ f,c,z)
m := ¯ f/F
¯ h, ¯ f,c,z
− − − − − →
F ←−
decryptor
H(gz¯ h−c,¯ h, ¯ f)
? = c
if “yes” F := ¯ hx
if “no” F :=?
The decryption is correct as we have for ¯ h = gr, ¯ f = mhr that ¯ f/F = mgrxg−rx = m.
Remarks 1. The ciphertext (¯ h, ¯ f,c,z) consists of an ElGamal ciphertext (¯ h, ¯ f) and a
Schnorr signature (c,z) on the ”message” (¯ h, ¯ f). The signature is for the private/public
key pair (r,¯ h).
2. Fast encryption with a data expansion rate near 1. We let the messages have a diﬀerent
format. Let the message be a sequence m = (m1,...,mn) ∈ Zn
q and let Hn : G → Zn
q be a
hash function that provides ”long” hash values11 in Zn
q. Encipher a message m into (¯ h, ¯ f,c,z)
where ¯ h = gr, ¯ f = m ⊕q Hn(hr), c = Hn(gs,¯ h, ¯ f), z = s + cr for r,s ∈R Zq. Here ⊕q is the
component-wise addition in Zn
q. Decrypt the ciphertext (¯ h, ¯ f,c,z) into ¯ f ⊕q Hn(¯ hx) provided
that (c,z) is a signature of the message (¯ h, ¯ f) with public key ¯ h, i.e. c = Hn(gz¯ h−c,¯ h, ¯ f).
11Long hash values can be generated using a standard hash function H according to the following, or some
related, approach: Hn(m) = (H(m,1),...,H(m,n)), where n is the constant length (in terms of short hash
function outputs) of the desired hash function.
8The bit length of the ciphertext is log2 kGk+(n+2)log2 q, where the message is nlog2 q bits
long and kGk is the bit length of the group elements. The data expansion rate is 1+ 2
n+
log2 kGk
nlog2 q
which is near to 1 for large n. The short ciphertexts are as secure as the original ones.
Encryption requires only a long and a short hash as well as a long and a short addition. The
three exponentiations gr,hr,gs can be done beforehand.
3. Without encoding of messages. Signed ElGamal encryption requires that messages m are
encoded into the group G so that we can form mhr. Not all groups allow a natural algorithm
that encodes bit strings into group elements. Remark 2. shows, how to replace that encoding
by a hash function Hn : G → Zq.
4.1 Security against Interactive Attacks
Adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. The next theorem proves semantic security against
an adversary A mounting an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. In this attack the adversary is
given a challenge ciphertext and a decryption oracle for the decryption of arbitrary ciphertexts
except for the challenge. The attack is called adaptive because the queries to the decryption
oracle may depend on the challenges and their corresponding answers. We let the generic
adversary A perform t generic steps: group operations, inputs in G, queries to the oracle H,
queries to the decryption oracle not including the challenge ciphertext.
Theorem 5. Let A be given g,h, distinct messages m0,m1, a challenge ciphertext cipb
corresponding to mb for a random bit b ∈R {0,1}, and oracles for H and for decryption. Then
a generic A using t generic steps cannot predict b with a better probability than 1
2 +
¡t
2
¢
/q. The
probability space consists of the random h = gx,H,b and the coin tosses of the encipherer.
The next theorem shows security against the one-more decryption attack. This is inter-
esting in a setting where users are charged for interactions with the decryption oracle.
Theorem 6. Let the attacker A be given g,h, ciphertexts cip1,...,cipd, the corresponding
messages m1,...,md in random order and oracles for H and for decryption. Let the generic
A perform t generic steps including ` < d arbitrary queries to the decryption oracle. Then
A cannot produce ` + 1 message-ciphertext pairs with a better probability than 1
d−` +
¡t
2
¢
/q.
The probability space consists of the random h,H, the coin tosses of the encipherer and the
random ordering of the messages.
Proof of Theorem 5. For a non-interactive adversary A the claim follows from Prop. 4
because the Schnorr signature in cipb does not help A to decrypt.
We transform A into a non-interactive adversary A0 in that we successively eliminate
the ﬁrst interaction with the decryptor. Let the ﬁrst query to the decryptor be about the
ciphertext (¯ h, ¯ f,c,z). Let this be a valid ciphertext — A can check that validity and does not
get any information for invalid ciphertexts. Then A has produced that ciphertext without
interacting with the decryptor. Recall that ((¯ h, ¯ f),c,z) is a Schnorr signature of the ”message”
(¯ h, ¯ f) under the private/public key pair (logg ¯ h,¯ h). The equation c = H(gz¯ h−c,¯ h, ¯ f), required
for a valid signature, necessitates that the hash value H(gz¯ h−c,¯ h, ¯ f) is determined prior to
c,z — otherwise the equation holds with probability 1
q as the hash value is random. We see
that the hash value is of the form H(f,¯ h, ¯ f), where f is among the computed group elements
9f1,...,ft0. A gets c = H(f,¯ h, ¯ f) from the hash oracle and must compute z so that gz¯ h−c = f,
i.e., z = logg f + clogg ¯ h.
Now, consider the Main Case in the computation of (¯ h, ¯ f,c,z), where there is no collision
among the computed group elements f1,...,ft0. In the Main Case the p.d. of z does not depend
on h,¯ h whereas logg f + clogg ¯ h may depend on h and ¯ h. We distinguish the two values. We
let z0 = logg f + clogg ¯ h denote the value required for a signature, whereas z denotes the
computed value in (¯ h, ¯ f,c,z). Let the challenge ciphertext be cipb = (gr,mbhr,cb,zb), where
r ∈R Zq is secret, and let A be given logg(m0),logg(m1) (this can only facilitate A’s task).
Then A’s group steps refer exclusively to the group elements (f1,f2,f3,f4) = (g,h,gr,mbhr),
all given group elements are known powers of f1,...,f4. A computes group elements of the
form fi :=
Q4
ν=1 f
αi,ν
ν for i = 1,...,t0, where the exponent vector αi = (αi,1,...,αi,4) ∈ Z4
q
depends arbitrarily on previous non-group data. Let f = fi, ¯ h = fj, then we have
z0 = logg fi + clogg fj = hαi + cαj,(1,x,r,logg(mb) + xr)i.
Considering x,r as formal variables, z0 is a polynomial in Zq[x,r] that is linear in r,x. The
required value z0 evaluates that polynomial at instances x,r that are s.i. of the polynomial
coeﬃcients. By the argument of Lemma 2, the p.d. of z does not depend on ¯ h = gr,h = gx
and thus does not depend on r,x. We conclude that r,x must cancel out in the formal
polynomial z0 or else we have Pr[z = z0] ≤ 1
q. More in details we show the
Fact. If z = z0 then we have ˜ α =def (αi,2,αi,3,αi,4,αj,2,αj,3,αj,4) = 0 and logg ¯ h = αj,0
except for an event of probability 1
q.
Proof. By the argument of Lemma 2, the random gr,gx,r,x are s.i. of the non-group data
z,αi,αj — the p.d. of z does not depend on ¯ h = gr,h = gx and thus does not depend
on r,x. If ˜ α 6= 0 then z0 = hαi + cαj,(1,x,r,logg(mb) + xr)i is — due to the random r,x
— uniformly distributed over Zq. By the argument of Lemma 2, gx,gr,x,r are s.i. of the
non-group data z, and thus z0 is s.i. of z or else r,x must cancel out in z0. As z0 contains
the linear terms αi,2x + cαj,2x + αi,3r + cαj,3r and c is random, if x,r cancel out, we have
αi,2 = αi,3 = αj,2 = αj,3 = 0. Similarly, αi,4 = αj,4 = 0 is necessary to cancel out the
monomial xr in z0. We see that Prr,h,H[z = z0, ˜ α 6= 0] ≤ 1
q. This proves the claim as ˜ α = 0
implies logg ¯ h = logg fj = αj,0.
Eliminating the interactions with the decryptor. The plaintext corresponding to (¯ h, ¯ f,c,z)
is ¯ f/hlogg ¯ h = ¯ f/hαj,0 except for an event of probability 1
q. This eliminates the ﬁrst interaction
with the decryptor without increasing A’s number of generic steps, and reduces A’s probability
of success by 1
q in worst case. (This method is impossible in the Turing machine model.12)
Let there be ` interactions with the decryptor. We iteratively eliminate them by the above
method. This transforms A into a non-interactive generic A0 that performs t generic steps.
By Prop. 4 the non-interactive A0 predicts b not better than with probability
¡t0
2
¢
/q + 1
2. We
have seen that the probabilities of success of A and A0 diﬀer by `/q in worst case. Therefore,
A predicts b not better than with probability `/q +
¡t0
2
¢
/q + 1
2 ≤
¡t
2
¢
/q + 1
2 as t0 + ` ≤ t.
Plaintext awareness. The above method — of extracting from A the signature key logg ¯ h
and the plaintext corresponding to the constructed ciphertext — shows that signed ElGamal
12In the Turing machine model, eliminating an interaction with the decryptor increases the number of Turing
machine steps by a constant factor δ
−1, where δ is A’s probability of success in producing a valid ciphertext
(¯ h, ¯ f,c,z). Here the extractor has to try δ
−1 statistically independent hash functions in place of H.
10encryption is plaintext aware in the sense deﬁned in [BR94]. 2
Proof sketch of Theorem 6. As signed ElGamal encryption is plaintext aware, the attacker
can only construct ciphertexts corresponding to known plaintexts. In particular, the adversary
A can be transformed into a generic adversary A0 that does not query the decryptor about any
self-constructed ciphertext, performs t generic steps and succeeds essentially with the same
probability as A. A0 can only query the decryption oracle about ` of the input ciphertexts.
These ` decryptions give no information about the d − ` remaining input ciphertexts. This
is because the random bits of the ciphertexts are statistically independent. We can therefore
eliminate the ` decryptions and the resulting ` message-ciphertext pairs. This transforms A0
into a non-interactive adversary where the argument of Prop. 4 applies. Consider in the Main
Case, where there is no collision of group elements, the impact of a random permutation of
the indices i of the remaining d−` messages mi. By the argument of Lemma 2, that random
permutation of the indices is s.i. of A0’s guess of a correct message-ciphertext pair (mi,cipj).
Therefore, A0 cannot guess a correct pair (mi,cipj) better than with probability 1
d−`. The
Main Case occurs except with probability
¡t
2
¢
/q, hence the claim. 2
5 Security of Signatures against Interactive Attacks
Theorems 7 and 8 show that Schnorr signatures are secure against the one-more signature
forgery in the ROM + GM. These theorems cover blind signatures as required for anonymous
electronic cash. This is the ﬁrst sharp security result for simple discrete log signatures in the
interactive setting. We characterize the diﬀerent power of sequential and of parallel attacks.
Parallel attacks that beat the success rate
¡t
2
¢
/q of sequential attacks must solve an established
hard problem [H97]: they must ﬁnd an intersection point of ` + 1 hyperplanes in Z`
q out of a
collection of randomized hyperplanes.
Theorem 7. Let a generic adversary A interact with the signer and be given the generator
g, the public key h and an oracle for H. Let A perform t generic steps including ` sequential
signer interactions. Then A cannot produce ` + 1 signatures with a better probability than ¡t
2
¢
/q. The probability space consists of h, H and the coin ﬂips of the signer.
Theorem 8. If a generic adversary A surpassess in a parallel attack the
¡t
2
¢
/q-bound of
Theorem 7, he solves the following problem. Given an oracle for a random function F, A
ﬁnds distinct vectors αi ∈ Z`
q for i = 1,...,t and an intersection point of ` + 1 of the t
hyperplanes Hi = {x ∈ Z`
q|hαi,xi = F(αi)}. The fastest known non-generic method to ﬁnd
such an intersection point does not succeed better than with probability
¡T
2
¢
/q when using T
arithmetic steps over Zq.
Proof of Theorems 7 and 8. Notation. We let (rk,ck,zk) for k = 1,...,` denote the
interactions of A with the signer. The signer correctly transmits grk and responds to A’s
challenge ck by zk = rk + ckx. We abbreviate r := (r1,...,r`) and gr := {gr1,...,gr`}. We let
f1,...,ft0 denote the group elements of A’s computation. In the generic model A computes
fk of the form fk = gαk,0hαk,1gr1αk,2+...+r`αk,`+1 = ghαk,(1,x,r)i, where the exponent vector
αk = (αk,0,...,αk,`+1) ∈ Z`+2
q merely depends on previous collisions fi = fj, i < j < k, on
previous signer responses and hash values. We prove in Lemma 9 that the group element
gz0
ih−c0
i corresponding to a signature (m0
i,c0
i,z0
i) must be among f1,...,ft0 — we let i0 denote
11its index, gz0
ih−c0
i = fi0 = ghαi0,(1,x,r)i. Let there be t00 (distinct) queries to the hash oracle
resulting in t00 independent hash values in Zq. By assumption we have t0 + t00 = t.
Informal survey. It is assumed that A outputs distinct triples (m0
i,c0
i,z0
i) ∈ M × Z2
q
for i = 1,...,` + 1. The event that these are ` + 1 signatures is claimed to have no better
probability then
¡t
2
¢
/q for random h,H,r. By Lemma 9 we have gz0
ih−c0
i = fi0 for some i0 ≤ t0
and A receives c0
i as the hash value H(fi0,m0
i). A must ﬁnd the corresponding z0
i which by
gz0
ih−c0
i = ghαi0,(1,x,r)i satisﬁes zi = hαi0,(1,x,r)i + c0
ix. Hence, A must evaluate the linear
polynomial hαi0,(1,x,r)i + c0
ix at (x,r), where by Lemma 2 x is s.i. of (αi0, c0
i), except
that there is a prior collision fj = fk. By Lemma 1, collisions fj = fk occur at most with
probability
¡t0
2
¢
/q. Consider the Main Case, where there are no collisions. In the Main Case,
A can only succeed with (m0
i,c0
i,z0
i) if x cancels out in the polynomial hαi0,(1,x,r)i + c0
ix.
In order to cancel x out the challenges c1,...,c` must by Lemma 9 satisfy the equations
c0
i = −αi0,1 +
P`
k=1 αi0,k+1ck. This yields for each signature (m0
i,c0
i,z0
i) a linear equation for
c1,...,c`.
We separately study the complexity of sequential and of parallel attacks. In a sequential
attack the system of ` + 1 equations for c1,...,c` is solvable with probability at most
¡t
2
¢
/q.
The fastest known parallel, non-generic algorithm for solving the ` + 1 equations for c1,...,c`
succeeds with probability
¡T
2
¢
/q using T arithmetic steps .
Lemma 9. Let the output (m0
i,c0
i,z0
i) be a signature with a better probability than 1
q. Then
c0
i coincides with the value H(f,m) corresponding to some hash query (f,m) = (gz0
ih−c0
i,m0
i),
where f = fi0 for some 1 ≤ i0 ≤ t0. Moreover, c0
i,z0
i,i0 satisfy the equations z0
i = αi0,0 +
P`
k=1 αi0,k+1zk and c0
i = −αi0,1 +
P`
k=1 αi0,k+1ck.
Proof. The ﬁrst claim follows from the equation c0
i = H(gz0
ih−c0
i,m0
i) required for signatures
(m0
i,c0
i,z0
i). In the ROM this equation necessitates that A has queried that hash value —
otherwise the equality only holds with probability 1
q as the hash value is random. Thus the
hash value c0
i = H(f,m) results from a query (f,m) ∈ G × M, where (f,m) = (gz0
ih−c0
i,m0
i)
holds for the output (m0
i,c0
i,z0
i). We let 1 ≤ i0 ≤ t0 denote the index of f among the computed
group elements f1,...,ft0, and thus fi0 = gz0
ih−c0
i = ghαi0,(1,x,r)i.13 The latter equations and
rk = zk − ckx imply
z0
i = logg gz0
ih−c0
i + c0
ix = hαi0,(1,x,r)i + c0
ix
z0
i = αi0,0 +
P`
k=1 αi0,k+1zk + (αi0,1 −
P`
k=1 αi0,k+1ck + c0
i )x, (1)
A can easily compute the correct z0
i in the particular case that c0
i = −αi0,1 +
P`
k=1 αi0,k+1ck.
The secret key x cancels out in this case and we have z0
i = αi0,0 +
P`
k=1 αi0,k+1zk, where the
signer responses z1,...,z` and the coeﬃcients αi0,0,... ,αi0,`+1 are known to A.
Conversely, A must select c1,...,c` so that the secret key x cancels out in (1). Otherwise,
the equation (1) holds merely with probability 1
q as x is by Lemma 2 s.i. of the non-group
data z0
i,αi0,0,...,αi0,`+1,c1,...,c`. If x does not cancel out, A’s probability of success is not
13The index 1 ≤ i
0 ≤ t
0 is determined by the output (m
0
i,c
0
i,z
0
i) via the equation fi0 = g
z0
ih
−c0
i. We use that
collisions of hash values are quite unlikely. The event that there is either a collision of group elements or a
collision of hash values occurs with probability at most
¡t
2
¢
/q. For simplicity we abbreviate fi0 = g
z0
ih
−c0
i even
though that equation only holds a posteriori, i
0 and ®i0 depend on h,H,r.
12better than 1
q. This proves the Lemma as the claimed equations hold if x cancels out. 2
Now suppose that A outputs ` + 1 signatures (m0
i,c0
i,z0
i) for i = 1,...,` + 1. W.l.o.g. let
A query the hash oracle about the t00 values H(fi,mi) for i = 1,...,t00. A’s selection of ` + 1
hash values H(fi0,m0
i) out of these t00 values is deﬁned by the output signatures (m0
i,c0
i,z0
i)
via c0
i = H(fi0,m0
i), where fi0 = ghαi0,(1,x,r)i. A’s challenges c1,...,c` must solve the equations
of Lemma 9:
H(fi0,m0
i) = −αi0,1 +
P`
k=1 αi0,k+1ck for i = 1,...,` + 1 (2)
Each satisﬁed equation yields a signature. Each of the t00 hash queries deﬁnes by the corre-
sponding equation (2) a hyperplane of solutions (c1,...,c`) in Z`
q. A’s challenges (c1,...,c`)
form an intersection point of ` + 1 of these hyperplanes.
Complexity of parallel attacks. Consider a particular selection of ` + 1 hash values
H(fi0,m0
i) out of the t00 given hash values H(fi,mi). The corresponding ` + 1 equations
(2) in the unknowns c1,...,c` are solvable with probability at most 1
q. The probability refers
to the random inhomogenities H(fi0,m0
i) + αi0,1 for i = 1,...,` + 1 and does not depend on
A’s choice of fi0,m0
i,αi. As there are
¡ t00
`+1
¢
possible choices of the `+1 out of t00 hash values,
the equations (2) are solvable with no better probability than
¡ t00
`+1
¢
/q. Finding an intersec-
tion point of ` + 1 hyperplanes is free of costs in the generic model. But now consider the
non-generic costs in terms of arithmetic steps:
A simple method to ﬁnd a common intersection point of ` + 1 hyperplanes tries all
¡t00
`
¢
choices of ` out of the t00 hyperplanes — in general ` of the hyperplanes have a common
intersection point — sorts these
¡t00
`
¢
intersection points and checks for a collision. This
requires at least
¡t00
`
¢
arithmetic steps over Zq. That method is optimal for ` = 1.14
In a variant of the above method one forms for a subfamily of some T — from the
¡t00
`
¢
choices of ` out of t00 hyperplanes — the T intersection points of the corresponding `-tuples
of hyperplanes, and one searches for a collision of the intersection points. Two intersection
points coincide with probability at most 1
q. Hence, the restricted search succeeds not better
than with probability
¡T
2
¢
/q using T arithmetic steps over Zq — no matter, how we select
the family of T `-tuples of hyperplanes. The success probability
¡T
2
¢
/q is analogous to the
success probability
¡t
2
¢
/q in Theorems 7 and 8, however T counts arithmetic steps while t
counts generic steps. We pose it as an open problem to beat that
¡T
2
¢
/q bound.
From the work of Hastad [H97] we know that beating the naive method — in maximizing
a subset of hyperplanes with a common intersection point — is NP-hard. The approximation
problem considered in [H97] is NP-hard in worst case — our problem seems to be hard for
almost all instances. This is because the t00 inhomogenities H(fi,mi)+αi,1 of the hyperplanes
are independent random numbers due the random oracle H. It seems to be irrelevant that
the adversary can choose himself the vectors αi.
Complexity of sequential attacks. A sequential attack iterates a sequence of parallel attacks
with ` = 1. In the Main Case sequential attacks do not succeed better than with probabil-
ity
¡t00
2
¢
/q. As the Main Case occurs except with probability
¡t0
2
¢
/2, and
¡t00
2
¢
+
¡t0
2
¢
≤
¡t
2
¢
,
sequential attacks do not succeed better than with probability
¡t
2
¢
/q. Sequential attacks can
14For ` = 1 there is an intersection point of 2 of the t
00 hyperplanes iﬀ there is a collision among the Zq-
numbers (H(fi,mi) − αi,2)/αi,1 for i = 1,...,t
00. These Zq-numbers are pairwise s.i. due to the random H. A
collision occurs with probability
¡t00
2
¢
/q, it can be found in O(t
00 logt
00) arithmetic steps by sorting.
13be performed eﬃciently on the non-group data.15 2
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